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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout aie Spring of 1991 the Kurdish issue has been in the 
headlines on a daily basis. In March, in the wake of Iraq's defeat in the Second 
Gulf War, the Kurds of northern Iraq rose up in rebellion against Saddam 
Hussein's Ba'athist regime. The remnants of Hussein's army suppressed the 
revolt, putting some two million Kurds to flight, seeking refuge along the 
Turkish and Iranian borders. American, British and other coalition forces, and 
the United Nations, have been drawn into the region to protect and care for the 
refugees, while Kurdish leaders try to negotiate a modus vivendi with Saddam 
Hussein. The tragic situation has focused Western attention as never before on 
the Kurdish people and their conflicts with the states of the region. 
The Kurds are a stateless, largely Sunni Muslim, Indo- European-
speaking people whose traditional homeland is concentrated in the rugged, 
mountainous area of die Middle East where Turkey, Iraq, and Iran converge. 
Approximately half of the Kurds in the world live in Turkey. Much smaller 
numbers also inhabit Syria and the Soviet Union, while a diaspora has now 
spread to several other Middle Eastern states as well as western Europe and 
North America. 
In August 1984, the Marxist-nationalist Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan 
(PKK) or Kurdish Workers Party led by Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan resurrected its 
guerrilla war of independence in southeastern Turkey that had supposedly been 
smashed by the Turkish military after it had come to power in September 1980. 
Despite repeated, subsequent claims that this PKK insurgency had been brought 
under control, clashes continued to occur on an almost daily basis. By the spring 
of 1990, they had escalated to such a degree that for the first time anti-
government demonstrations broke out in more than a dozen small cities in 
southeastern Anatolia. The Turkish government felt compelled to issue an 
unprecedented decree which censored the press, authorized internal exile, and 
provided for the evacuation of villages for security reasons.1 
Many Turks, including their government, feel that the PKK and other 
Kurdish separatists have been receiving aid from various states and groups 
which desire a weakened Turkey. The former President of Turkey himself, 
Kenan Evren, was reported to have declared in October 1981, for example, that 
the Kurdish problem stems from foreign incitement2 In his "Statement" of August 
1989 on the escalating PKK guerrilla operations, General Necip Torumtay, die 
Chief of Staff in Ankara, asserted that the PKK "receives important support from 
foreign powers."3 Commenting on Tommtay's "Statement," a knowledgeable 
Turkish source concluded: "As long as separatist camps remain open in Syria, 
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Lebanon, Iran and Iraq, and as long as they receive indirect support from 
European countries, Turkey will have to counter a resurrection of armed 
terrorism every year."4 The purpose of this study is specifically to analyze these 
allegations and to assess the significance of transnational sources of support for 
the contemporary Kurdish insurgency in Turkey. 
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
In making these charges the Turks undoubtedly have been influenced by 
their historical memories of European imperialist schemes to weaken and divide 
the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since its 
birth in the early 1920s, the Turkish Republic has perceived Kurdish national 
awareness as a mortal threat to its own territorial integrity. This position was set 
by the Republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The Turks suspected that 
the British had supported Sheikh Said's Kurdish revolt in eastern Turkey during 
1925 to weaken the Turkish claim to the vilayet of Mosul in Iraq, which was 
largely inhabited by Kurds. A Kurdish revolt against Turkey would vitiate 
Turkey's claim that it would best represent the Kurds of Mosul. Since then, the 
Turkish view has been that the Mosul-Kirkuk area of Iraq was taken from Turkey 
at a time of political weakness. 
The Turks, however, were not able to produce any credible evidence to 
substantiate their suspicions. On the other hand, the Kurdish revolt was crushed 
in part because the French gave the Turks permission to use the Baghdad railroad 
that passed through Syria for troop transport.5 Similarly, during the Kurdish 
revolt around Mt. Ararat in 1930, although the Kurds did receive some help from 
the Armenians (see below), Iran allowed Turkish troops to pass through its 
territory and surround the insurgents. Iran and Turkey later legalized then-
agreement by making minor border adjustments in 1932.6 In addition, under the 
Treaty of Sadabad in 1937 and the Baghdad Pact of 1955, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq 
all agreed, in part, to cooperate on the Kurdish question.7 This collaboration 
included measures to prevent cross-border communication and support among 
the Kurds and, in general, sought to forestall any joint, transnational Kurdish 
action that might challenge the present international boundaries. 
Inside Turkey itself, the country's rulers have been committed to 
eradicating anything suggestive of a separate Kurdish identity. Even the 
Kurdish language has been constitutionally "prohibited by law" for use "in the 
expression and dissemination of thought" (Article 26,of the 1982 Constitution). 
The US State Department has described the situation in the following mannen 
Although millions of Turkish Kurds are fully integrated into the 
political, economic, and social life of the nation, the [Turkish] 
Government's pursuit of full assimilation has led to the pro-
scription of publications of any book, newspaper, or other 
material in the Kurdish language. Neither are materials dealing 
with Kurdish history, culture, and ethnic identity permitted, and 
there have been instances of arrests of entertainers for singing 
songs or performing in Kurdish . . . . The foregoing limits on 
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cultural expression are a source of genuine discontent to many 
Turks of Kurdish origin, particularly in the economically less 
developed southeast, where they are in the majority.8 
Nonetheless, Kurdish agitation has continued in Turkey and abroad, thereby 
sustaining Turkey's anxieties about foreign interference in the Turkish-Kurdish 
dispute. The essay now examines the alleged sources of transnational support 
for the Kurdish insurgency, on a region-by-region basis. 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
A1989 commentary on the situation by an independent Turkish weekly 
declared: 
Countries neighboring Turkey in the Middle East, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, have been used for years by terrorists as secure grounds for 
training activities, arms supplies, cross-border attacks and es-
tablishing political or military headquarters.9 
Turkish intelligence sources have charged that PKK bases have existed just 
across the border in all three of Turkey's southern neighbors. In Iran, these 
camps supposedly have been located at Selvana, Rezhan, and Ziveh; in Iraq, at 
Sinhat, Kishan, Nirve, Lolan, and Deryasor, and in Syria, at Kamisli and 
Resulyan.10 A closer analysis of these three states indicates, however, that Syria 
has given the PKK by far the most covert support, while Iraq at least has made 
the most attempts to cooperate with the Turks, even giving Turkey carte blanche 
to pursue the PKK into northern Iraq on four different occasions since 1983. 
Iran's role in this matter has fallen somewhere in between these two extremes. 
SYRIA. Syria has provided a haven for Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan, the leader of 
the PKK, since before the Turkish coup of 1980. After that event, the Syrian 
government permitted the remnants of the PKK to reassemble and reconstitute 
themselves on Syrian territory and in the parts of Lebanon they controlled. The 
first three PKK "congresses" also took place there. To this day, Ocalan 
continues to live in Damascus. 
There are probably a number of reasons for this situation. Smoldering 
animosities concerning the Turkish annexation of Hatay (Alexandretta) prov-
ince in 1939, as well as current problems dealing with the waters of the Euphrates 
River, which first flows through Turkey before reaching Syria, have long kept 
Turkish-Syrian relations cool. When completed in the 1990s, Turkey's giant 
Ataturk Dam is projected to be able to divert half of the more than 26 trillion liters 
of water that flows into Syria. 
In addition, disagreements exist over Cyprus, Israel, and the PLO 
leadership. The memories of the harsh Ottoman rule that lasted into the early 
years of the twentieth century also probably play a background role. Further-
more, one should mention the grandiose ambitions of Syria's leader, Hafez 
Assad, to occupy a dominant position in the region. What is more Assad's 
brother, Rifat, is said to be a good friend of Ocalan. Rifat reportedly gave Ocalan 
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an armored green Mercedes as a symbol of his trust and friendship, and has also 
helped bring together the PKK and the small Turkish terrorist group, Acilciler, 
headed by Mihrac Ural.11 
In July 1987, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal signed a security 
protocol with the Syrians in Damascus. Under its terms Syria agreed to stop 
permitting the PKK to raid Turkey from Syrian borders and to remove the PKK 
camps from its territory. For its part Ankara agreed to supply Syria with no less 
that 500 cubic meters per second of water per month. A request for the 
extradition of Ocalan, however, was refused. 
Further Syrian intransigency soon became evident as the PKK camps 
were simply moved to the Syrian-controlled parts of the Bekaa Valley which 
were supposedly beyond Syrian legal control. "There is still evidence that 
Syrian territory is being used in many of the PKK attacks which are still taking 
place," concluded a Turkish report, based, in part, on the testimony of captured 
PKK agents, some of whom were Syrian nationals.12 Reportedly at another high 
level meeting between the two states in Mardin during June 1988, Syria again 
rejected a request for Ocalan's extradition, apparently wanting to keep him as 
a "trump card" for the future.13 By the fall of 1989, Turgut Ozal, now President, 
was even threatening to cut off Syria's water supply, but such action was seen 
as highly unlikely because of its international implications. 
IRAN. The profound ideological differences between secularized Turkey and 
Islamic Iran notwithstanding, the two states have been able to maintain sur-
prisingly friendly relations. This is because both have calculated that such a 
policy would serve their respective interests.14 As a result, Iran has never served 
the role of PKK safe house to the extent played for so long by Syria. N e v -
ertheless tensions exist During the First Gulf War, both Iran and Iraq armed the 
other side's Kurds as fifth-column allies. Thus Teheran supported the Iraqi 
Kurds who harbored the PKK. Turkish incursions against these Kurds in pursuit 
of the PKK inevitably drew Iranian disapproval. What is more Iran refused to 
allow the Turkish military to pursue the PKK across its borders as the Iraqis did. 
As one observer noted: "The Turks could reasonably complain to both Iran and 
Iraq that by arming the Kurds they riskfed] destabilizing the whole Turkish-Iraq-
Iran triangle."13 
In the summer of 1989, a Turkish source charged that, in addition to the 
PKK camps that had been in Iran for sometime already, a new one had been 
established at Ucneviye north of Urumiye with support from the Eastern bloc 
and Cuba.16 According to Fatih Tan, a PKK repentant (former PKK fighter now 
working for the Turkish government), the PKK camps in Iran consisted of about 
twenty-five militants under the command of Ocalan's brother, Osman Ocalan. 
Supposedly some eighty PKK guerrillas had infiltrated into Turkey over the 
Iranian border in April 1989. Most of them had been trained at the Resistance 
Camp of Ahmet Kesip and the Orencik Martyrs. 
Another report indicated that the two PKK mobile radio stations mat had 
been established clandestinely were believed to be in Iran.17 In addition, further 
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data indicated an "extensive PKK force deployment from camps in Iranian 
territory to the . . . buffer zone between Iran and Iraq."18 Some 200 PKK 
guerrillas were now based at the Basiyan region where the borders of Turkey, 
Iran, and Iraq form an inverted triangle. They were "located in such a way that 
the terrorists may immediately pull back into Iran . . . preventing any cross-
border attacks of Turkish troops."19 Despite these problems, one Turkish study 
still concluded that "since November 1984 there have been only a few PKK 
attacks originating from Iran Teheran was generally careful to restrict the 
PKK's activities in Iran."20 
IRAQ. As noted above, Iraq has permitted Turkey to pursue PKK guerrillas into 
its territory. This has occurred on at least four different occasions since 1983. 
Thus, although Iraqi bases have been invaluable to the PKK, they were not 
enjoyed with the permission of the host government 
According to a Turkish report in 1989, after the First Gulf War the Iraqi 
government regained control of its northern (Kurdish) areas; PKK camps were 
maintained mere as well camouflaged "tent camps" in mountainous places 
which are very hard to reach. As of the summer of 1989, such camps were 
supposedly to be found in Kishan, Duruk, Urah, Gulkan, Besili, Sutuni, Zivek, 
Arris, Nazdur, Birri, Kiru, Barzan, Hayat, Danalah, S. Yunis, and Durjan.21 
Despite its cooperation with Turkey, some Turkish officials have 
charged that Iraq discretely supplied weapons to the PKK in return for information 
about Massoud Barzani's Iraqi-based Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP). 
One Turkish officer declared in 1987: "The Iraqi regime has an interest in the 
border region where they cannot enter because of Barzani forces. They [Iraq] 
give weapons and ammunition to the PKK in order to receive information on 
activities of Iraqi Kurds. The PKK while on one hand receives support from 
those Kurds on the other sells them out for its own survival."22 
Another report seconded this claim: "Baghdad is now reported supplying 
the PKK with guns and ammunition in exchange for information. The feeling 
is the PKK is telling Iraqi troops where Barzani's camps are."23 If these reports 
of Iraqi duplicity are valid, they help explain why the Iraqi KDP broke its 
alliance with the PKK at the end of 1987. 
FIRST GULF WAR (1980-88). The Mosul-Kirkuk area in northern Iraq is 
inhabited by some 2,500,000 Iraqi Kurds, who became virtually autonomous 
during that war given Iraq's desperate need to concentrate on its fight for 
survival against Iran. The possibility that Turkey might try to occupy this oil-
rich area in the aftermath of an Iraqi collapse contained immense international 
implications.24 GivenTurkey'sgreatneedfor oil, perceived interest in suppressing 
any possible Kurdish state that might be created in northern Iraq following an 
Iranian victory, and the PKK's longtime usage of northern Iraq as a sanctuary 
for raids into southeastern Turkey, Turkish military action seemed plausible. 
Of immediate concern, however, was the strategic pipeline which 
carried a million barrels of oil a day from Kirkuk to Iskenderun in Turkey. This 
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pipeline met one-third of Turkey's oil needs, and also provided some $300 
million in Iraqi rental fees. The Turkish authorities warned Iran against striking 
it following threats by Khomeini's government to do just that in its attempt to 
launch an offensive into northem Iraq. Iran's refusal to guarantee the integrity 
of the pipeline was described by a Turkish official as "unfortunate" because his 
country could not remain a spectator if its "crucial interests" were harmed. 
In August 1987, Turkish border officials in Hakkari province inter-
cepted a special operations company of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
near Semdinli and took into custody ninety-five prisoners. Turkish officials 
claimed that the Iranians were trying to sabotage the pipeline, but the Iranians 
protested they were merely trying to attack a hostile Kurdish guerrilla camp in 
northern Iraq. After diplomatic discussions the Turks repatriated the prisoners. 
Thus the pipeline issue led to speculation in the Turkish press concerning 
a possible Turkish military operation to save it from Iranian forces and their Iraqi 
Kurdish allies, Barzani's KDP, which, as pointed out above, supported the PKK 
until the end of 1987. Turkish military sources stated privately they were 
studying possible options, including the military one. 
Huseyin Avni Guler, a former Turkish intelligence officer, and Hasan 
Isik, a former Turkish foreign minister, claimed to have evidence that the United 
States was encouraging Turkey to undertake military action in the eventuality 
of an Iranian attack against Kirkuk and the pipeline. Such a move would prevent 
Iran and possibly Syria from occupying the area and thus depriving Turkey, a 
NATO ally of the United States, of its use. 
Most observers, however, felt that such Turkish action was highly 
unlikely given Turkey's vulnerable frontier with the Soviet Union, serious 
problems with Greece, and continuing occupation of northern Cyprus, not to 
mention the certain opposition of both Syria and Iran. In the event, of course, 
Iraq did not collapse, and, with the end of the war in the summer of 1988 and the 
reassertion of Iraqi authority in its Kurdish north, the entire question became 
moot. In the wake of the Second Gulf War, the Kurdish situation in Iraq has 
gained international attention, but remained uncertain as this essay went to 
press. 
WESTERN EUROPE 
In recent years a Kurdish diaspora of some 500,000 has formed in 
western Europe due to a variety of political, economic, sociological and 
educational factors. Over 400,000 Kurds now live in West Germany, 60,000 in 
France, 10,000 in Sweden, 5,000 in Belgium, and others in Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Italy. Turkish sources have complained that "various extrem-
ist organizations and the PKK have used European territory as theirplay-ground, 
recruiting new militants, establishing liaison with the East Bloc, transferring 
militants to Turkey, etc."25 
Indeed the Socialist government in France has helped to establish and 
fund the Kurdish Institute in Paris whose Director is the Turkish Kurd, Kendal 
Nezan. In October 1989, this Institute sponsored an international conference on 
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the human rights situation and cultural identity of the Kurds. The Swedish 
government has given official recognition to the Kurdish National Union and 
helped to finance the publication of over twenty books in Kurdish for adults and 
children. The Swedes also have permitted the establishment of associations for 
Kurdish teachers, doctors, and writers. From 13-15 January 1989, Stockholm 
hosted a policy-setting conference of nine Kurdish organizations (including the 
anti-PKK, Turkish-Kurdish alliance of some six organizations called Tevger) from 
eight different European states. 
In June 1987, the European Parliament passed what was considered to 
be a strongly anti-Turkish resolution, "On a political solution to the Armenian 
Question." Not only taking the Armenian side on this issue, the Parliament went 
on to chastise the Turks for their Kurdish problem, as well as many other alleged 
sins: "The European Parliament.. . believes that the refusal by the present 
Turkish Government to acknowledge the Genocide against the Armenian 
people . . . and the denial of the existence of the Kurdish question . . . are 
insurmountable obstacles to consideration of the possibility of Turkey's acces-
sion to the [European Economic] Community." 
When the PKK killed some thirty civilians in the southeastern Anatolian 
village of Pinarcik just two days after this resolution was passed, Turkish 
President Evren, with some merit, accused the European Parliament of having 
encouraged the PKK's actions. In truth, however, what probably best explains 
the gratuitous, anti-Turkish action of the Parliament and its erection of what it 
termed "insurmountable obstacles" to Turkey's membership in the EEC, was 
the desire to keep Turkey out of mat organization for economic reasons. 
Manifesting a militancy that until now had been rare outside of their 
traditional homeland, groups of Kurds briefly occupied Turkish offices in West 
Germany and the Netherlands, and the Iraqi Airways office in Paris during the 
autumn of 1986. The following March Kurdish groups occupied a number of 
Turkish Airlines offices in various west European cities and demonstrated in 
front of numerous other offices.26 Summing up the situation, Siyamend Othman, 
an official of the Kurdish Institute in Paris wrote in 1987: "It is my personal 
opinion (and fear too) that this [traditional Kurdish quiescence] might not 
remain the case for much longer since the interviews I have conducted with the 
leaders and cadres of Kurdish organizations incline me to think that the Kurds, 
particularly those of Turkey, are beginning to get desperate for attention."27 
Indeed an underground conflict among Turkish Kurds in western Eu-
rope has apparently leftatleasttwentypersonsdead in the late 1980s. According 
to the police, the bloodshed has been caused by the PKK, many of whose 
supporters have been living in exile in western Europe since the Turkish military 
coup of September 1980. The violence seems to be aimed at eliminating 
defectors, attacking ideological foes, extorting money, and striking at collabo-
rators. AnumberofviolentincidentshaveoccurredatA/ewrozcelebrations. For 
several years nine Turkish Kurds were held in Sweden under what was termed 
"commune arrest" because of killings there in 1984 and 1985.28 
Because of this situation, Sweden labeled the PKK a "terrorist organi-
zation" in 1984 and refused entry to its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Nevertheless 
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its members were allowed to remain in the country, while Huseyin Yildirim, 
until recently the PKK spokesman in western Europe, continued to live in 
Stockholm. 
Following the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme on 
28 February 1986, Stockholm Chief of Police Hans Holmer was convinced that 
it was the work of the PKK. Various motives, some rather bizarre, were offered. 
Most plausible was that the Swedish government, as mentioned above, had 
branded the PKK a "terrorist organization" and denied its leader an entry visa. 
Another claimed that Palme had been working on a secret plan that envisaged 
autonomy for the Kurds in Turkey. He had been killed because he had asked for 
some concessions from the PKK which amounted to the Kurds falling under a 
Swedish mandate. Still another claimed mat Iran had paid a large sum of money 
to the PKK to do the deed because Palme had opposed arms sales to Iran.29 
Several PKK members were arrested in January 1987 in connection with 
the murder, but released shortly afterwards due to lack of evidence. Indeed the 
reputed PKK scenario seemed most far-fetched because Palme was a well-
known supporter of such causes as mat of the Kurds. Even more, of course, to 
assassinate a statesman of the stature of the Swedish Prime Minister would 
obviously backfire in terms of the Kurdish cause. In other words, to use the 
PKK's own terminology, to murder Palme inherently would not be a successful 
act of armed propaganda. 
The eventual arrest, conviction, and release on appeal of a common 
Swedish criminal for the deed demonstrates the confusion of the Swedish 
authorities on the Palme matter. In retrospect the reputed PKK connection 
smacks of a disinformation campaign (possibly by the Turks) to smear the PKK 
in an ex-post-facto manner. 
In June 1987, the West German Interior Ministry issued a report which 
stated: "The orthodox communist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) was in 1986 
by far the most active and most militant extremist organization among the 
Kurds." The report added that in a publication in West Germany the previous 
year, the PKK had referred to itself as "the force that has taken up the struggle 
against the fascist Turkish occupation" and declared that it was committed to 
"revolutionary violence" in pursuing its goals. Six months later, the Federal 
Criminal Office in Wiesbaden called the PKK "a dangerous organization" and 
declared that during the previous year (1987) in West Germany it had been 
"involved with carrying out at least one murder, two attempted murders, three 
cases of assault, and four other serious incidents, including robbery, blackmail 
and coercion."30 The Office also stated that there were at least 1,000 Kurdish 
extremists in West Germany trying to overthrow the Turkish government. 
"Although their primary targets are the Turkish government and fellow Turks 
[Kurds], West German citizens and institutions who cooperate with die Turkish 
government... are also in danger."31 
A Kurd who felt that such activities discredited the Kurdish cause wrote: 
"The Palestinians have their Abu-Nidals; the Armenians an Asala, and we, alas, 
seem to have to cope with [the] PKK."32 During a crackdown in Cologne in July 
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1987, West German police rounded up several Kurdish activists and confiscated 
money and other valuables worth more man $437,000. 
In addition, the West German authorities claimed that the PKK was 
operating through legal organizations to provide cover for their illegal activities. 
As of July 1988, for example, such fronts included, the Kurdish National 
Liberation Front (ERNK), the Patriotic Kurdish Workers Party, Kurdish Patriotic 
Women's Union, and Kurdish Revolutionary Youth Union. Indeed, although 
he was probably exaggerating, Yilmaz Ciftci, a PKK spokesman in Aniens told 
the Cyprus Weekly that his party's political arm, the ERNK, "is a massive 
organization with committees foryouth, women's and workers' sections and the 
liberation army."33 A Turkish report declared that there were PKK branches in 
the following West German cities: Mainz, Offenburg, Russelsheim, Olderburg, 
and Dortmund.34 In 1989, the PKK was publishing a sophisticated newspaper 
in West Germany called Serxwebun (Independence), while the ERNK was 
producing one of similar dimensions known as Berxwedan (Defense). 
In the spring of 1987, the PKK began to urge Kurdish supporters living 
in West Germany to donate the clothing, armaments, and communications gear 
necessary to equip guerrillas. Specific suggestions included overcoats, raincoats, 
durable sport shoes, hand-knit wool socks, warm gloves of thin material, 
undershirts of semifine material, non-nylon shirts, binoculars, radio receivers, 
compasses, bayonets, and cash.35 
On the other hand the PKK apparently has been falsely accused of the 
murder of a West German consular affairs attaché, Siegfried Wielsputz, who 
was shot to death in Paris on 4 January 1988. A leaflet denouncing alleged West 
German mistreatment of the Kurds and signed by the ERNK was found on his 
body. The ERNK, however, denied responsibility and denounced the murder as 
a "cowardly act" Siyamend Othman, a Kurdish spokesman, added that "no 
Kurd of any organization has ever attacked a Western diplomat. We do not think 
this has anything to do with Kurds."36 
An ERNK spokesman even went so far as to suggest mat "the Turkish 
National Intelligence Organization and the CIA were behind the plot"37 Twelve 
days later a West German charter plane blew up near Izmir, Turkey, killing all 
sixteen people aboard. Once again, the ERNK was supposedly to blame, but 
as with the Wielsputz murder and the Palme accusations, it would seem that 
there was a campaign to discredit the Kurds in general and the PKK in 
particular. 
Despite the opportunities offered by Europe, in October 1988, Ocalan 
decided to make a complete about-face in his European strategy and denounced 
Europe as "a battleground for foul-play." Arguing that "if we saved ourselves 
there [and].. .saved also some of our concepts," it was done "with much pain,"3* 
and asserted that there was no difference between the fate of the Kurds in Europe 
and in Turkey. In the one they were being assimilated in the Turkish cities, while 
in the other they were being Europeanized. 
The PKK leader declared that Europe's "intention is to corrupt the 
PKK." He now believed that Europe "will first corrupt the ideological-poütical-
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military structure [of the PKK] and then turn the PKK into a tool for their 
imperialist aims in the region." The intention of the "Brussels Circle" was to 
protect the territorial integrity of Turkey, a fellow NATO member. The only 
way for the Kurds to avoid this trap was for all the militants based in Europe to 
return to the "war-zone," undergo serious party and military training, and 
struggle against Turkey. One of the factors that apparently brought on this tirade 
was what Ocalan saw as an European attempt to pacify the PKK by promising 
it financial aid and political asylum, if it would "abandon the resistance... and 
create a more moderate organization which could be accepted." His former 
associate in Europe, Huseyin Yildirim, had taken the initiative in trying to 
establish such a more moderate PKK and indeed was now a rival for the 
leadership of the Kurds in Europe. Nevertheless, it would seem likely that the 
PKK will continue to use Europe as a safe house and platform for its programs. 
THE SOVIET UNION 
The Turks and Russians have been enemies for centuries. Until the 
creation of the Turkish Republic after World War I, no state had benefited more 
than Russia from the decline of what Tsar Nicholas I once referred to as "the sick 
man of Europe." Hassan Arfa, for example, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian army 
(1944-1946) and the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey (1958-1961), wrote: 
During the Russo-Turkish wars of 1829 and 1853-55, the Rus-
sians tried to bring the Kurds to their side, promising them a kind 
of autonomy and organizing a Kurdish regiment under Russian 
officers. In 1877, when the Turkish armies were fighting the 
Russians around Erzurum and Van, the sons of Badr Khan 
revolted in the Hakkari, Bhutan and Badinan districts . . . . It 
seems that such ideas were inculcated in them by the Russians.39 
Once Turkey reversed this decline and became a member of the NATO 
alliance, however, continuing Russian ambitions to reach the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East's oil through Turkey had to be more subtle. Clandestine support 
of the Turkish Kurdish separatist organizations either directly or through the 
Syrians, the main Soviet ally in the Middle East, would be one obvious method 
to further this long-standing goal. 
In February 1985, the trial of several Kurdish guerrillas featured evi-
dence of direct Syrian support for them. At that time it was said that the Syrians 
were not acting alone but had "the backing and encouragement of a super-
power."40 A Turkish foreign ministry official declared: 
We have good reason to believe that the Russians are paying the 
bill for these guerrillas. It is easy for their agents to find a few 
hundred unemployed young men who will do this kind of thing 
for the sake of adventure. It only costs a few million dollars a 
year. They use the so-called Kurdish Labor Party as a front It 
has a completely Marxist program. They can't foment terrorism 
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anywhere else in Turkey now, but in the southeast they can keep 
the fires burning in the hope of heating mem up in the future.41 
One PKK defendant, Abdurrahoman Kandemir, told a martial law court 
in Diyarbakin "Our aim is to establish a Communist Kurdish state. This state 
is to be a member of the Warsaw Pact."42 Other PKK members on trial testified 
about Syrian and Soviet involvement and support for their cause, and of having 
been trained in Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese guerrilla camps.43 
A report in a prominent American Armenian weekly declared that: "The 
Syrian intelligence service is providing both haven and assistance to a variety 
of international terrorists." The account added that: "Heading the list of radical 
groups now enjoying the protection of the Syrian rulers are the Kurds." All of 
Ulis "enjoys the indirect support of the Soviet Union, which through its 
assistance to Syria pursues a policy of destabilizing the region, particularly 
Turkey."44 
Under interrogation PKK members have related how Palestinians with 
Soviet training instructed them in camps under Syrian control after 1980. One 
account told how a Palestinian, who used the code name "Lt. Abu Haldun," 
trained PKK members at the Palestinian Cephe Nidal camp. The contact 
supposedly was facilitated through the Soviet consulate and cultural center in 
Damascus. Nayif Hawatmeh's Soviet-financed Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine also gave the PKK excellent training facilities at this 
time.43 
Abdulkadir Aygan, a PKK repentant, has spoken about a field inspection 
in PKK training camps after 1981 in which the inspectors were officers from the 
Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Cuba. Aygan has also described his extensive 
military training in Damascus after his escape from Turkey in 1982 and his brief 
stays in southern Cyprus and Greece. His roommate at that time was the personal 
translator of Ocalan; this individual told Aygan about the PKK leader's routine 
meetings with officials from the Soviet consulate in Damascus.46 While in-
teresting, such testimony, of course, is suspect because mere usually is no 
independent way to verify i t It also is possible that the repentant is simply telling 
his interrogator what he wants to hear in exchange for leniency. 
In a similar vein, therefore, is the testimony of Mehmet Emin Karatay, 
the former PKK provincial leader in Mardin who was captured by security forces 
on 10 March 1989. He told officials that several Syrian representatives and 
diplomats from Eastern Bloc states based in Damascus participated as guests 
when the PKK recently held military exercises in the Bekaa Valley. He also 
declared that the Soviet Union had put pressure upon Syria not to honor its 1987 
protocol with Turkey to prevent PKK raids from Syrian territory. He told 
Turkish officials mat, 
We were being transported by Soviet trucks to the Turkish 
border. Suddenly the trucks were stopped by Syrian patrols and 
we were detained. Ocalan received news of our detention and 
immediately contacted the Soviet officials. In 24 hours, we were 
released and helped to infiltrate into Turkey.47 
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A 1979 CIA report on the Kurdish problem and the role played by the 
Soviets was more circumspect. "The Soviet-Kurdish relationship, if tenuous, is 
relatively old." The Soviets "probably first established contact with the Kurds 
in the early 1920's. Little resulted, however."48 According to Gwynne Dyer, 
writing in 1973, the Soviets gave financial aid to the Kurds, among others, 
through the so-called International Minority Movement Front in Odessa as early 
as 1928.4' During the Dersim (Tunceli) revolt in 1937, "it was alleged by the 
Turkish government, but never satisfactorily established, that arms had been 
supplied to the Kurdish rebels by the Soviet Union."50 
In 1958, the Soviets started a clandestine radio station, Bazim Radyo 
(Our Radio) which broadcast communist propaganda to Turkey from Romania 
and East Germany. A second station, "the Voice of the Turkish Communist 
Party," began broadcasting from East Germany in 1968. Although this radio 
propaganda was mainly aimed at fomenting discontent among the Turks 
themselves, the Turkish Kurds were not ignored. This second station's com-
mentary of the day on 9 November 1985, for example, declared that: "The 
oppression of Turkish Kurdistan is continuing This means that the CIA, or 
in other words the United States, is supporting the oppressive and hunger 
policies being implemented by the fascist and chauvinistic Evren-Ozal dicta-
torship in Turkish Kurdistan." The station claimed that the US desire to protect 
its bases in eastern Turkey, "is why the United States is supporting the hunting 
down of patriots by the dictatorship's forces in Turkish Kurdistan." The 
commentary concluded that: "The only way to put a stop to these developments 
is for all patriots and democratic forces, Turks and Kurds, to oppose the 
dictatorship's special cooperation with the U.S. imperialists."31 
The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946 is one of the best examples 
of the Soviet willingness to use Kurdish nationalism against the territorial 
integrity of one of the states on its southern boundary, in this case Iran. In 1941, 
British and Soviet troops had occupied Iran to prevent it from supporting Nazi 
Germany. After the war this joint occupation was lifted, but the Soviets used 
their position to encourage an Azerbaijani Republic in northern Iran and the 
rump Mahabad Kurdish Republic in northwestern Iran. The Soviet intention 
probably was to divide Iran and in time incorporate some of its lost provinces. 
Although a Kurdish nationalist, Qazi Muhammad, the leader of the 
Mahabad Republic, had been "groomed to assume the leadership of a pro-Soviet 
Kurdish movement that would be tied to the Communist-nationalist effort in 
Azerbaizan." The Soviets "promised that military equipment including tanks, 
cannon, machine guns, and rifles would be sent." In November 1945, the 
Russians delivered a printing press. "Soon afterwards publications in Kurdish 
began to appear."52 
Although there was no communist-style social revolution, "Soviet 
influence was there . . . its strength related to the calculation by the Kurdish 
leaders that their cause would be bound to succeed if they anticipated Soviet 
desires and obeyed the advice of Soviet officials. Collaboration was extended 
willingly." Soon after the Kurdish Republic was established, "there arrived in 
Mahabad two consignments of about 5,000 Soviet weapons including rifles, 
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machine guns, and pistols No tanks or artillery pieces had yet been delivered 
in spite of previous promises, but in their place the Russians provided 'tank 
destroyers', bottles of petrol equipped with wicks."53 
Sensing the weakness of the Mahabad Kurds, the Soviet agent "Ibrahimov 
preached to them the advantages of Kurdish union with Azerbaijan until such 
time as the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey could be liberated to make possible the 
formation of a larger, more viable Kurdish state." Nevertheless, in March 1945, 
"Captain Salahaddin Kazimov of the Soviet army arrived in Mahabad to help 
organize and train the national Kurdish army." Within a month "nearly all 
persons connected with the Kurdish Government or army could at appropriate 
times appear looking like Soviet officers in khaki with boots, riding breeches, 
and caps."54 
Anglo-American pressure eventually forced the Soviets out of Iran, and 
with the removal of its sponsor, the Mahabad Republic quickly collapsed. Qazi 
Muhammad was hanged, while the rump state's military leader, the Iraqi Kurd, 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani, managed to escape to the Soviet Union. The "Red" 
Mullah, as he was then called, lived there in exile from 1947-58, and seemed to 
be proof of the Soviets' willingness to exploit Kurdish nationalism for their own 
purposes. 
In the late 1950s, however, Barzani was allowed to return to Iraq where 
in time he led a lengthy rebellion with considerable but indirect American, as 
well as Iranian, aid because those two states sought to chasten Iraq. This Kurdish 
insurrection was only terminated when Iran, with tacit American support, 
reversed its policy and stopped supporting the Iraqi Kurds after signing the 
Algiers agreement with Iraq on 6 March 1975.55 In light of his earlier association 
with the USSR, it is ironic that when Barzani died in the United States in 1979, 
he had come to be seen by some as an agent of US imperialism. 
Although used by both, Barzani, of course, was neither a stooge of the 
Soviets nor the Americans. Rather he was a traditional, tribal Kurdish nation-
alist leader who took aid from whatever source he could. The American 
willingness to use and then drop Kurdish nationalism in his case illustrates how 
the Soviets have no monopoly on this score. Indeed, Kurdish sources have 
argued that the United States opposes Kurdish nationalism in Turkey because it 
is a valuable US ally and member of NATO. Turkey provides radar stations and 
large military installations near the Soviet border. These bases became all the 
more important for the United States once the Iranian alliance was lost in 1979-
80. Furthermore, Turkey ' s southern border with Syria is important for detecting 
Syrian military movements against Israel.56 
Similarly, the Soviets are often tempted to support the Kurds in Turkey 
and elsewhere as a method ultimately to weaken the United States, as well as 
promote their own expansion southward. The Soviets must be cautious, how-
ever, so as not to antagonize the governments in Ankara, Baghdad, and Teheran 
with which the Soviets have important relations to protect Sarcastically, 
therefore, "many Kurdish intellectuals are beginning to compare the Soviet 
Union to a doctor whose interests require the patient (Kurdistan) to remain alive 
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but not completely cured so that he may be used one day for research."57 Indeed, 
Archie Roosevelt, Jr. tells how, because of past memories of Russian and Soviet 
depredations, "Kurds . . . still frighten their crying children into silence by 
threatening them with the word 'Russian.'"58 The CIA Report concluded that, 
as of 1979 at least: 
while the Soviets have aided the Kurds occasionally in the past, 
there is no evidence that they are currently doing so. Indeed, 
Moscow has done its best to stay aloof of the present round of 
Kurdish unrest In any event, since the early 1970s, Soviet state-
to-state relations with all the countries involved have consistently 
taken precedence over the needs and interests of the Kurds 
Despite claims in the Turkish press... Moscow has been careful 
to distance itself from the Kurdish separatism.59 
Similarly a joint appeal in 1985 by the Socialist Party of Turkish 
Kurdistan (SPTK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq declared: 
It is also high time, for all that are interested and concerned with 
the Kurdish question to divorce themselves from the absurd 
extreme notions of seeing communism and the Soviet Union, on 
the one hand, and CIA and U.S. backing, on the other, behind 
every movement in Kurdistan. A much more balanced and 
objective analysis can be achieved by concentrating on the 
indigenous factors, by scrutinising practices and policies of the 
respective regimes, and by considering it as an independent 
phenomenon, instead of always searching for foreign hands 
behind the scenes.60 
This, of course, does not mean that the Soviets would fail to fish in 
troubled waters. As the CIA Report warned: "Should Turkey enter a period of 
economic and political instability, Moscow might be tempted to try to exploit 
the Kurdish issue... but it would act only with extreme caution."61 Coming as 
it did from the intelligence service of the Soviet Union's superpower rival, this 
assessment constituted strong evidence that the Soviets probably were not the 
key factor behind the Kurdish guerrilla war in Turkey as some had asserted. 
Given the remarkable demise of communist rule in eastern Europe during the fall 
of 1989 and liberalization in the Soviet Union itself, this conclusion would seem 
all die more likely to be valid, at least for the present. 
THE ARMENIANS 
Most observers have considered the Kurds and Armenians to be "invet-
erate enemies,"62 whose irredentist claims against Turkey are mutually in-
compatible. Much bloodshed had occurred between die two in the past, and 
during World War I, the Kurds, who suffered terribly themselves, played a 
notorious role in the Armenian massacres. As a result, G.R. Driver, die noted 
English authority of the early twentieth century, went so far as to conclude 
immediately after the War, that an independent Armenia would lead to "a war 
of extermination between the two races as neither will submit to the yoke of the 
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other."63 Nevertheless, if for no other reason than their sharing of a common 
enemy (Turkey), an alliance between the two is not inconceivable today. The 
purpose of this section is to analyze traces of this collaboration. 
During the Paris Peace Conference ending World War I, the Kurdish 
delegation headed by General Sharif Pasha and the Armenian delegation led by 
Boghos Nubar Pasha agreed to cooperate. The two presented a joint proposal 
for a Kurdish and an Armenian state whose exact borders remained to be 
determined. The Kemalist revival of Turkey, however, frustrated their plans. 
InAugust 1927,theAimemanRevolutionaryFederation(theDashnaks)64 
sent an agent, Vahan Papazian, to Lebanon. There he participated in the 
foundation of Khoybun, a new Kurdish nationalist organization which eventu-
ally launched a major Kurdish uprising in the area of Mt. Ararat under General 
Ulsan Nun Pasha. This Kurdish rebellion in Turkey was crushed completely in 
1930, but only after the Turks made considerable efforts to suppress it. The 
observations of Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the late Secretary-General of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, on this matter are especially interesting. 
An explanation should be given as to why Dashnaktsutyum 
supported the Khoiboun. The chief reason was that the 
Dashnakyans themselves were not capable of organizing any 
armed movement on Turkish territory and therefore made use of 
the revolt of the Kurdish population directed against Turkey, 
whom the Dashnakyans regarded a sworn enemy Besides, 
the Dashnakyans supported the Kurdish revolt, hoping it would 
weaken Turkey and create a suitable opportunity for the future 
struggle of the Armenians. In case an independent Kurdish state 
were formed, new prospects would arise for the future struggle 
of Dashnaktsutyum bom against Turkey and against the U.S.S.R. 
The independent Kurdish state was to become a base of the 
Dashnakyans for creating a great and independent Armenia.63 
During mis era, Mevlanzade Rif at acted as the liaison between the Kurds 
in Khoybun and the Armenians. This individual was the Kurdish author of an 
anti-Turkish, propagandistic account of an apocryphal Young Turk meeting in 
1915 where a decision was supposedly taken to exterminate the Armenians. 
Presumably such "revelations" were expected to facilitate an Armenian-Kurdish 
alliance. A certain Dr. Tutunjian, the head of the Dashnaks' Central Committee 
in Syria, served as Rifat's Armenian counterpart. In addition, as noted above, 
the Soviet-sponsored International Minority Movement Front in Odessa gave 
financial aid to die Armenians, Kurds, and anti-Kemalists Turks in 1928.66 
In the 1980s, association between the Kurds and the Armenians has 
taken various forms. A "declaration" of cooperation between die PKK and the 
Armenian Secret Army forthe Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was announced 
in a press conference in Sidon, Lebanon on 6 April 1980.67 ASALA members 
reportedly joined PKK guerrillas and other Kurdish groups when they fought 
against Turkish troops trying to rout them out from their northern Iraqi sanctuary 
in May 1983 and again in October 1984.68 Commenting on this seemingly 
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anomalous Armenian-Kurdish cooperation, The Economist speculated: "It may 
be that a tactical alliance between Kurds and Armenians, said to have been 
concluded some three years ago, is in operation on the ground Armenian 
brains and world-wide links combined with Kurdish military experience would 
produce a formidable guerrilla liberation movement"69 
Yilmaz Guney, the famous Turkish Kurdish film maker, called for 
Armenians "to join the struggle of the Kurds and the Turks in the interior to 
topple die presentdictatorship."70 Monte Melkonian, a dissident AS ALAleader, 
stated in an interview that "to reestablish the political line of the [Armenian] 
struggle," he envisaged "forging alliances with certain liberation movements, 
notably in Turkey and widi Kurds."71 The so-called "Armenian World Con-
gress" asserted in 1983 that to "combat . . . Turkish colonialism" it was 
"necessary to forge an alliance between the Armenian and Kurdish peoples."72 
Similarly Patrick Devedjian, a well-known French Armenian lawyer who has 
defended many of the Armenians accused of killing Turkish diplomats in 
France, stated in 1985 mat the Armenians could start "another Vietnam.... The 
Turkish border is very permeable.... This could mean an alliance with Kurds."73 
For their part, 'Various Kurdish groups based in Britain expressed their 
desire 'to collaborate' with Armenian militants against Turkey" in a conference 
held in London in May 1985.74 Celal Talabani, the leader of the PUK, stated in 
October 1988 mat: "Concrete cooperation exists between the Kurds and the 
Armenians at the present time." Using the phrase "rapprochement between the 
Kurds and the Armenians," the Iraqi Kurdish leader added: "We have decided 
to continue our struggle in a joint way in the future We now have very close 
relations with all the Armenian organizations in the world."73 
Indie summer of 1987,me Turkish press claimed mat AS ALA combatants 
were among the PKK guerrillas who recently had carried out murderous raids 
in the Mardin area of southeastern Anatolia. Some of the attackers reportedly 
had spoken in Armenian. One Turkish villager was even quoted as saying: "I 
am almost certain Kurds led the assault and left to Armenians to massacre the 
innocent villagers."76 The following spring it was reported mat the PKK was 
recruiting Syrian Armenians for communications purposes so that they could 
use the Armenian language for secret messages.77 
Given the paucity of results over the past decade, however, one must 
tentatively agree with Melkonian's assessment that the claims of Armenian-
Kurdish cooperation have been "more . . . a tactical ploy than strategic 
alliance."78 Indeed, Armenian terrorist attacks against Turkish interests stopped 
in die mid-1980s, and ASALA itself apparently disbanded after a series of 
murderous internal splits.79 This assessment, of course, does not preclude me 
distinct possibility tiiat ASALA combatants did support the PKK in die early 
1980s and that certain Armenians living in Syria and Lebanon probably still do. 
THE UNITED STATES 
The United States has been die main ally of Turkey since die late 1940s 
when me Truman Doctrine helped Turkey to stand up to die Soviet direat against 
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the Straits and northeastern Anatolia. Over the years this close alliance has 
successfully weathered several crises. Until the Kurdish refugee crisis devel-
oped after the recent Gulf War, the Kurdish problem in Turkey, however, had 
threatened to create new difficulties between the two allies. 
During the First Gulf War some Turkish officials felt that the United 
States "might also be involved in one way or another" with the PKK insurgency. 
The argument was made that PKK destabilization activities along Turkey's 
southeastern border "would eventually force Turkey into the Gulf War or at least 
ease its attitude in face of the use of bases for this. Thus America too is seen 
among the countries which benefit out of separatist activities."80 
A number of other theories also have been suggested for explaining the 
reputed support of the United States for the Kurds. The first is that the US "seeks 
an autonomous Kurdish state which it could use as a base for Rapid Deployment 
Forces." A second notion is that to prevent a possible Soviet advance into the 
Kurdish region, "America may believe that it is necessary to create a natural 
barrier, a barrier of flesh, made up of Kurdish recruits." Finally, it is alleged that 
the US is trying to divide Turkey so that it can take "control of its overall 
economic and political mechanism." Although these theories may sound 
paranoid to most Americans, many reputable Turks honestly seem to believe 
that "Washington is openly playing a game which endangers Turkey ' s domestic 
security and sovereignty in the southeast region."81 
Several other actions by the United States have further fuelled this 
sentiment In February 1988, for example, the Turks complained that a "U.S. 
State Department" report referred to a Kurdish minority in Turkey, while also 
criticizing that state for the human right violations it had committed against the 
Kurds.82 This was followed by what many Turks referred to as the "Schifter 
Blunder." According to Turkish sources, Richard Schifter, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, "went out of his 
way . . . to prove that the Kurds were a different population from the Turks, 
linguistically and culturally," when he declared: "We believe that although they 
[the Kurds] are not included in the Lausanne Treaty, they are a national minority 
by international standards."83 
The Turks also regarded the visit of the Iraqi Kurdish leader, Celal 
Talabani, to Washington on 9 June 1988, as "yet another example of US 
hypocrisy."84 Talabani, had just recently signed an accord with the PKK. While 
in Washington, he met with several officials from the Departments of State and 
Defense and held a press conference at the National Press Club where he 
disclosed that he had discussed Turkey's position against the Kurds with these 
US officials. He also declared that if Turkey cooperated with Iraq, it would be 
bis right to do so with any other group working against Turkey. He further 
faulted Turkey for saying that the PKK was only killing women and children.85 
The Turkish reaction to Talabani's visit to Washington was bitter. 
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Inal Batu, claimed that Ocalan and Talabani "had 
joined forces under a joint strategy and the latter had been given audience by US 
State Department officials." Milliyet correspondent Mumtaz Soysal saw the 
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visit as US support for an independent Kurdistan in case of a Soviet threat to the 
Persian Gulf. Tercuman foreign relations writer Fahir Armaoglu viewed it as 
"an indication to the separatists that if they do as told, they will be supported." 
Oktay Eksi in Hurriyet stated that Talabani was "openly an enemy of Turkey" 
and "an ally of the other side," and he wondered what "the real intention of the 
United States... is when it helps Armenian nationalism develop against Turkey 
and shows interest to Kurdish freedom movements."86 
Shortly after Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Talabani 
again journeyed to Washington. There was much critical speculation on the part 
of the Turks that the United States might favor a motion to give Talabani 
autonomy or even an independent state in northern Iraq in return for his support 
against Saddam. "In Ankara, officials at the defence and foreign ministries were 
seriously worried that such a development would endanger Turkey's own 
security . . . . After all, what Talabani was talking about was a separate state 
which would border Turkey... in an area which is currently being used by the 
separatist PKK organization."87 
Despite Turkish anxieties, however, the United States apparently ignored 
Talbani's offer of support against Saddam Hussein. In fact, to the contrary, the 
US went out of its way to court (successfully) Turkish support for the UN em-
bargo of Iraq and the Coalition military operations that followed in 1991. The 
idea the United States has played some type of background role in supporting the 
PKK seems totally at variance with the facts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In analyzing the reasons for the deteriorating situation in the Kurdish 
region, the Turkish government has stressed the element of transnational help 
for the insurgents, as well as the poor socio-economic conditions in the 
southeast. Although both of these points possess validity, they ignore the main 
reason for the Kurdish problem in Turkey: the official cultural suppression of the 
Kurds. Without the catalyst of this unfortunate situation, the transnational 
sources of support for the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey analyzed above would 
have fallen on barren ground. Speaking to the point, the Turkish writer, Aziz 
Nesin, declared at a meeting in Ankara in May 1989: "If these people cannot 
even say that they are Kurds and if they are being forced to accept the historical 
thesis saying they are Turks, there is no way to put democracy into practice in 
this country."88 
What then can be done? Even before the current crisis, the PKK had 
succeeded in calling the Kurdish problem in Turkey to the attention of the world. 
However, given the relative power of Turkey and its determination to defend its 
territorial integrity, it is not likely that the PKK will be able to achieve its 
ultimate goal of establishing an independent Kurdistan in southeastern Anatolia. 
Does this mean, therefore, as a senior Turkish military commander has wamed 
that, "We must accept realities and be prepared for a long struggle. This is like 
the situation which the British face with the IRA and the Spaniards wim the ETA 
[Basque] separatists."89 
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This negative prognostication does not have to materialize if the Turkish 
government is able to manifest a greater sense of maturity and self-confidence. 
As then Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal cryptically responded in 1989 to 
a question about the existence of a Kurdish minority in Turkey: "If in the first 
years of the Republic, during the single-party period, the State committed 
mistakes on this matter, it is necessary to recognise these."90 
If die authorities could now bring themselves to no longer view expres-
sions of Kurdish cultural awareness as a mortal threat to the continuing existence 
of the territorial integrity of Turkey, it is likely that many of the disaffected 
Kurdish elements in that state could learn to accept their role as loyal Turkish 
citizens. Most of the Turkish Kurds already do. What they want is the simple, 
basic human right of cultural freedom. 
It is necessary then to have the wisdom and strength of an Ataturk who, 
if he were alive today and mus could see what an impasse his Kurdish policy has 
led to, might trust more in the permanency of the institutions he had created and 
fear less the inherent logic of democracy by granting Turkey's citizens of 
Kurdish ancestry their most elemental cultural rights. This probably does not 
mean that a federal solution is necessary. But it does imply, as Erdal Inonu, the 
leader of the main opposition party in Turkey (and son of Ataturk's closest 
lieutenant, Ismet Inonu) has stated: "Everyone should express himself without 
fear in his mother tongue."91 Indeed, in the summer of 1990, Inonu's Party 
issued a major report on the issue which termed the ban on the Kurdish language 
"primitive" and an action "which serves to alienate the people." The report 
concluded that "the solution should be sought in a unitary, democratic and 
pluralist state."92 
Turkey's allies, the United States and the European Economic Commu-
nity (which Turkey longs to join), should encourage and help Turkey to take 
these steps. If it does, Turkey hopefully will have become stronger both 
politically (because its Kurdish problem at least will have become more 
manageable) and economically (as a member of die EEC). In the meantime, 
while the Turkish government finds a way to permit Kurdish cultural expression 
within the limits of a unitary Turkish state, it would help if others would be more 
understanding of the dilemma faced by that state, as well as more willing to grant 
die positive accomplishments of that state's nationalities policy to date. 
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